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Abstract
Rendezvous and capture (docking) operations may be performed either automatically or
under manual control. In cases where humans are far from the mission site, or high-bandwidth
communications lines are not in place, automation is the only option. Such might be the case with
unmanned missions to the moon or Mars that involve orbital docking or cargo transfer. In crewed
situations where sensors, computation capabilities, and other necessary instrumentation are
unavailable, manual control is the only alternative. Power, mass, cost, or other restrictions may
limit the availability of the machinery required for an automated rendezvous and capture. The only
occasions for which there is a choice about whether to use automated or manual control are those
where the vehicle(s) have both the crew and instrumentation necessary to perform the mission
either way.
The following discussion will focus on the final approach or capture (docking) maneuver.
The maneuvers required for long-range rendezvous operations are calculated by computers. It is
almost irrelevant whether it is an astronaut, watching a count-down timer who pushes the button
f'n'ing the thruster or whether the computer keeps track of the time and fires with the astronaut
monitoring. The actual manual workload associated with a mission that may take as long as hours
or days to perform is small. The workload per unit time increases tremendously during the final
approach (docking) phase and this is where the issue of manual versus automatic is more
important.
The decision over whether a mission will be under automatic or human control will not be
made for technological reasons. The Soviets pioneered automatic docking in October 1967 when
Kosmos (Cosmos) 186 docked with Kosmos 188 automatically. Clearly current American
capabilities in this area, though unproven in space, should be at least as high as Soviet abilities of
24 years ago. However, all Gemini and Apollo docking operations, and all satellite rendezvous
and capture maneuvers performed by the space shuttle were performed under manual control. The
rationale for using manual control as opposed to automatic control have their origins in the Right
Stuff, lack of automatic capability, and human factors. (Incidentally, the common perception that
the Soviets use automatic control for all of their docking operations is not correct. When
cosmonauts are in the approaching vehicle, they take over from the automatic system when the
range is a few hundred meters. The Progress resupply vehicles dock automatically, but the crew
are very carefully monitoring the situation and are ready to take control if necessary. (Newkirk,
1990))
NASA commanders and pilots have historically (and most likely will continue to) come
from a military pilot background. They have the Right Stuff and they want their hands on the
"wheel." They do not want to sit idly by and watch the automatic system perform the maneuver
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for them. This philosophy isnot restrictedto futuredocking operations.The space shuttleand
many commercial jet airliners have an automatic landing capability. (Landing an aircraft is roughly
analogous to a spacecraft docking operation as they both involve terminal guidance.) In the space
shuttle's case, this automatic landing capability has never been used. Commercial airline pilots
typicallytakeout the automaticsystem only periodically,ratherthan routinely,tomake sureitstill
works. While one might argue thata docking ismore deterministic(thereare no crosswinds,rain,
snow, or other obstacles)and thereforeeasierto be automated, the factremains thatin more
mundane environments thanspace,human naturepreventstheuse of automaticpilotsystems.
Automatic docking with space station Freedom is almost a non issue. Docking could
probably be performed with passive reflectors on the station, as MarshaLl Space Flight Center
researchers have been simulating on the air-bearing floor for many years. However, with a target
as valuable as the manned station, an active targeting system would most Likely be an imperative.
Unfortunately, the laser rangefmder for docking was removed from the station design early on its
design. Without this device, or something similar, automatic docking will not be performed.
In addition to the Right Stuff justifications, and the lack of essential targeting hardware,
there are human performance reasons for using manual control when possible. Humans are good
controllers but poor monitors. There is a very real fear, particularly in commercial aviation, of
automating pilots out of the loop. The existence of accidents in nuclear power facilities and
subway systems serves to support this contention. (Wiener, 1988)
The following extended quotation relating to manual control was taken from
(Brody, May 1991, pp. 4-5).
The importance of manual control aspects of spaceflightoperations,such as
rendezvous and docking, was recognized earlyin the United Statesspace program. After
only threemanned flightsintheMercury Program, theTechnicalDirectorof theBehavioral
Sciences Laboratory, Aerospace Medical Research Laboratories,Wright-PattersonAFB
concluded that"men can contributegreatlytothesuccessfulaccomplishment ofmany types
of space missions.... the Mercury astronautswere able to manually compensate for
cquipmcm malfunctionsand therebycomplete missionswhich otherwisewould have failed
or terminated prematurely" (Grether, 1963, p. 79). As Gemini XII and Apollo XI
astronautBuzz Aldrinexplains,"Manned orbitalrendezvous was a vitalfield,because any
way you cut it,ifwe were going to assemble largeinterplanetaryspacecraft,we'd have to
master the techniques of space rendezvous---bringingtwo or more separatelylaunched
spacecrafttogetherin orbit.With computers wc could reduce the blizzardof spherical
geometry and calculusequationsdown toautomated rendezvous procedures.But I'dsccn
enough autopilotsmalfunctionduring my flyingcareertorealizethatthe spacecraftNASA
planned touse forEarth orbitalunarspaceflightwould need some kind of manual backup"
(Aldrin & McConnell, 1989, p. 67). The Soviets alsovalue the flexibilitythatmanual
control allows in "the capabilitiesof man to see three dimensions and to evaluate the
situationbetterthan a machine forflightconditionsthathave not been provided for by the
program" (Meshcheryakov & Minaev, p. 804). Gemini X and Apollo XI astronaut
Michael Collinsadvocatesmanual controlas follows:"was thisnot a noble cause,tobuild
an autonomous capability,toallow a manned spacecrafttoroam freeofground control,to
compute its own maneuvers? Was not the very name of the game, in manned space flight,
to put the pilots in control" (Collins, 1974, p. 169)?
Further justification for manual control may be found in the airline industry where
"pilots still manually fly even the most highly automated aircraft, if only to maintain their
flying skills in the case that they are called on if the automatics fail" (Nagel, 1988,
pp. 293-4). Also, the adaptive capability that humans bring to control tasks adds further
weight to the decision to use manual control instead of automation.
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While automation is and will continue to be an Important aspect of manned space
It is unlikely that the pilot wiU be eliminated, any more than will the operator of a
nuclear power plant. Our society believes that humans should have ultimate
responsibility for control of complex systems even if inserting the human degrades
overall system performance most of the time. The human is still the ultimate back-
up system. While machines that are overloaded fail abruptly, people degrade
gracefully under excessive levels of workload. Thus it seems prudent to include
human operators, even if only as the sub-system of last resort that can "pull the
plug." Furthermore, there are also strong political forces to keep humans
employed. (Kantowitz & Casper, 1988, p. 183)
A number of studies have been performed recently to quantify the human performance
envelope involved with piloting a spacecraft docking maneuver. (Brody, 1987, 1989ab, 1990ab,
1991; Brody and Ellis, 1990, 1991ab, in press) Many factors affect the ability of a crewperson to
perform such a maneuver including: thruster magnitude, braking gates, control mode, impact
velocity, docking port location. With a better understanding of how these factors affect
performance, mission and hardware designers will be able to take action to increase safety,
performance, reliability, and productivity while reducing cost. Benefits from this work, such as
reduced operational costs, will greatly enhance the United States space program.
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